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OPSOMMING 
Aanvalle op trusts by egskeiding en in onderhoudsaangeleenthede: Riglyne vir die 
toekoms 
In hierdie artikel word die verskillende teoretiese grondslae vir aanvalle op trusts by eg-
skeiding en in onderhoudsaangeleenthede uiteengesit. Eerstens word die aanwendings-
terrein en die gevolge van die remedie om  trust as  skyntrust te verklaar ondersoek en 
tweedens word gekyk na die aanwendingsterrein en die gevolge van die remedie om die 
trustsluier te deurdring. Daarna word die Suid-Afrikaanse huweliksgoederereg- en onder-
houdsake waarin aanvalle op trusts geloods is chronologies bespreek. Die beslissing in 
elke saak word telkens aan die teoretiese grondslae van elkeen van die twee relevante 
remedies gemeet om aan te toon waar die howe fouteer het en waar hulle op die regte 
spoor was. In die gevolgtrekking word die moontlikheid van aanvalle op trusts verder 
vanuit  geslagsgelykheidsperspektief en die beste belange van die kind beskou. Daar 
word ook verwys na moontlike alternatiewe metodes wat aanwending mag vind, maar in 
die slotsom word die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat indien die twee primêre remedies korrek 
aangewend word hulle voldoende is om suksesvolle aanvalle op trusts in egskeidings- en 
onderhoudsaangeleenthede te loods. Howe moet egter nie wegskram van hulle verpligting 
om behoorlike oorweging aan alter ego bewerings te verleen nie en hulle bevoegdheid 
uitoefen om die trustsluier te deurdring by egskeiding en in onderhoudsaangeleenthede 
om die misbruik van die trustvorm in te perk. Insgelyks moet howe waaksaam wees om 
wel te bevind dat  bepaalde trust slegs  skyn of simulasie is waar dit duidelik blyk dat 
die stigter geen bedoeling gehad het om  trust op te rig nie, maar uitsluitlik opgetree het 
met die doel om alle bates buite die bereik van  gade of onderhoudsgeregtigde te plaas. 
Waar geen misbruik van die trustvorm bewys word nie of  ware bedoeling om  trust op 
te rig klaarblyklik is, behoort trusts egter nie blootgestel te wees aan enige aanval by 
egskeiding of in onderhoudsaangeleenthede nie. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years much has been written about the treatment of trusts upon  
divorce.1 It is arguable that much of what we cover in this article has already 
been alluded to by some of these authors. We do feel, however, that we have ap-
proached the problem from a different angle. Du Toit, for example, approached 
the matter from the angle of the different kinds of matrimonial property systems, 
whereas we feel that the whole issue has very little to do with the different  
matrimonial property systems which are encountered upon divorce.2 Du Toit’s  
approach is perfectly understandable, as many of our courts have fallen into the 
same trap. Furthermore, these authors concentrated mainly on one way of attack-
ing trusts upon divorce, while we feel that both the common law remedy of  
going behind the trust form and the court’s power to recognise the fact that a 
trust is a mere simulation or a sham might be appropriate and applicable not only 
upon divorce but also in maintenance matters, depending, of course, on the par-
ticular facts and circumstances of each case.3 Our interpretation of many of the 
cases discussed by these authors, especially the effect of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s decision in WT v KT,4 differs quite drastically from the interpretation of 
the other authors. As our conclusions also go considerably farther than the con-
clusions of any other author, we feel that our article makes a valuable contribu-
tion to academic discourse on this issue.  
We begin the article by setting out the two different theoretical bases for at-
tacking trusts upon divorce and in maintenance matters. Next, we chronologically 
discuss the way in which our courts have tackled the issue in maintenance and 
matrimonial matters, while simultaneously indicating where our courts erred and 
where they made commendable decisions. We do this by comparing the decision 
in each case with the theoretical foundation of each remedy. The cases Jordaan v 
Jordaan,5 Badenhorst v Badenhorst,6 BC v CC,7 VZ v VZ,8 MM v JM,9 RP v 
DP,10 WT v KT and YB v SB11 are discussed. In our discussion we take the issue a 
few steps further by also viewing a possible attack on trusts upon divorce and in 
maintenance matters from the perspective of gender equality and the best inter-
ests of the child. We also refer to alternative methods which might be applicable, 
but conclude that the court’s powers to either declare a trust a sham or go behind 
the trust form, if applied correctly, would suffice as appropriate remedies for  
attacking trusts in maintenance matters and upon divorce. 
________________________ 
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2 THEORETICAL BASES FOR ATTACKING TRUSTS UPON 
DIVORCE AND IN MAINTENANCE MATTERS  
Despite the fact that section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act12 provides that 
trust property shall not form part of the personal estate of the trustee, except in so 
far as he or she, as trust beneficiary, is entitled to the trust property, there are 
primarily two remedies for attacking trusts upon divorce and in maintenance 
matters. These two remedies are declaring the trust to be a sham and piercing the 
veil or veneer of the trust. Unfortunately, our courts have inconsistently used  
elements of both these remedies for taking either the value of trust assets or trust 
assets per se into account for purposes of the division of assets upon divorce (in 
marriages in community of property, marriages with complete separation of 
property concluded before the coming into operation of the Matrimonial Property 
Act13 and marriages with application of the accrual system) and the determina-
tion of maintenance obligations against former spouses and/or children. There is, 
however, a fundamental difference between the two remedies, as was first  
emphasised by Binns-Ward J in Van Zyl v Kaye14 and later confirmed by Mayat 
AJA in the Supreme Court of Appeal in WT v KT.15 The distinction between the 
remedies has also been pointed out and explained by various legal scholars such 
as Stafford.16 To illustrate this distinction, the nature of, the requirements for and 
the consequences of each remedy will be set out next. 
2 1 The remedy of declaring a trust to be a sham trust 
A sham is something which is not what it appears or purports to be and which is 
meant to trick or deceive people.17 According to De Waal in the case of a sham 
trust, the question is whether a valid trust has been created at all.18 According to 
Binns-Ward J in Van Zyl v Kaye19 the test to determine if a trust is a sham is 
whether or not the requirements for the establishment of a valid trust were met or 
whether the appearance of having met them was in reality a dissimulation. De 
Waal also states that “the question whether or not a trust is a sham trust has every-
thing to do with the requirements for the creation of a valid trust”, particularly 
the requirement that the founder must have had the intention to create a trust.20 If 
this intention is lacking, or the real intention is to create something different, no 
trust comes into existence.21 A sham trust is therefore present where a lack of 
true intention to form a trust is proved. The challenge is consequently to estab-
lish the “real intention” of the founder, which differs from the “simulated inten-
tion”.22 The essential question is therefore whether the true intention of the 
________________________ 
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ATTACKING TRUSTS UPON DIVORCE AND IN MAINTENANCE MATTERS 201
 
founder was to create a trust or to create something other than a trust, (such as a 
modus, a fideicommissum, an agency or a partnership). It appears that this ques-
tion further necessitates an examination into the commercial sense of the creation 
of a trust.23 Does the creation of the trust have commercial substance and/or does 
it make sense? It appears that in each case the answer to all these questions is  
essentially a finding of fact that will depend on the circumstances of each case.24 
If it is found that a trust is a sham, the result is that no effect will be given to 
the transaction and the “founder” will remain owner of the “trust assets” and  
neither the “trustee(s)” nor the “beneficiaries” will acquire any rights with regard 
to these assets.25 In the context of divorce and maintenance matters, it will mean 
that where a trust is found or declared to be a sham, the “trust assets” should be 
included in the spouse’s or maintenance debtor’s personal estate.26 The fact of 
the matter is that no trust ever came into existence.27 
2 2 The remedy of going behind the trust form/piercing the trust veil or  
veneer 
In respect of the remedy of going behind the trust form or piercing the trust veil 
or veneer, the basic premise is that the existence of a valid trust is accepted, but 
that there may be a justification to disregard the ordinary consequences of its ex-
istence for a particular purpose.28 It appears that such a justification would exist 
where the core idea of the trust concept, namely the separation of ownership (or 
control) from enjoyment (as reinforced by section 12 of the Trust Property Con-
trol Act), has been debased or is being abused.29 Stated differently, in the words 
of Binns-Ward J in Van Zyl v Kaye,30 justification for going behind the trust form 
will most likely be present  
“in the context of an absence of the dichotomy between responsibility and interest 
that constitutes the ‘core idea’ of the legal concept of a trust, in other words, in a 
context in which the trustees treat the property of the trust as if it were their 
personal property and use the trust essentially as their alter ego – an all too frequent 
phenomenon in certain family and business trusts in which the trustees are both the 
effective controllers as well as the beneficiaries”.31  
It further appears that an abuse of the trust form would be present where there is 
a failure by the trustees to adhere to the basic principles of trust administration.32 
These principles have been described as including the following: the trustee is 
________________________ 
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bound to exercise an independent discretion; the trustee must give effect to the 
trust deed, properly interpreted; the trustee must act with care, diligence and skill 
in the performance of duties and the exercise of powers; and where more than 
one trustee is appointed, they must act jointly at all times.33 
As regards the consequences of a successful call on the remedy of going be-
hind the trust form or piercing the trust veil (sometimes also referred to as the 
practice of treating the trust as the alter ego of the controlling person), it should 
be noted that both the trustees and the beneficiaries will acquire rights with re-
gard to the trust assets because a valid trust exists.34 However, our common law 
provides the remedy of going behind the trust form or piercing the trust veneer to 
a third party who has been affected by an unconscionable or dishonest abuse of 
the trust form.35 According to Binns-Ward J in Van Zyl v Kaye36  
“[t]he remedy might entail the making of a declaration that a trust asset shall be 
made available to satisfy the personal liability of a trustee, but it does not detract 
from the character of the asset as one of the trust and not that of the trustee; the 
existence of the trust remains acknowledged”.  
The remedy is therefore used only for a particular purpose and for all other  
purposes the trust’s separate existence remains unaffected.37 In the context of  
divorce and maintenance matters, this would mean that a court can order that the 
value of certain or all trust assets should be added to a trustee’s private assets for 
purposes of determining the extent of his estate or the joint estate. It further  
appears that certain or all of the assets of the trust may even be made available 
for distribution or redistribution upon divorce or for execution in a maintenance 
matter. This is the position because the remedy is regarded as an equitable remedy 
and “one that lends itself to a flexible approach in order to fairly and justly  
address the consequences of an unconscionable abuse of the trust form”.38 The 
application of this remedy is indeed indicative of what Joffe described as “the in-
fusion of ethics into South African trust law”, as opposed to following a strict 
contractual approach.39 Although it is said that the court’s function in terms of 
the common law remedy is a factual determination based on the circumstances of 
each case,40 the fact that this remedy is an equitable remedy seems (in our opinion) 
to also bring the court’s discretion into play. 
2 3 Concluding remarks on the distinction between sham situations and 
abuse situations 
From both a theoretical and a practical perspective it is essential to keep the two 
remedies apart and to approach sham situations on the one hand and abuse situa-
tions on the other from their different theoretical angles.41 It should be obvious 
________________________ 
 
33
 De Waal (2012) 1095; Du Toit (2015) 666. 
 
34
 De Waal (2012) 1097. 
 
35
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 See, eg, Du Toit (2015) 688 695 where he indicates that the court’s function in terms of the 
remedy of veil piercing is non-discretionary in nature and entails a factual determination of 
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that where a trust is a sham and does not exist at all, there is nothing to go behind 
and no “veneer” to “pierce”.42 In this regard, Van der Linde further correctly 
points out that one cannot speak of a “sham trust” and equate it with an “alter 
ego” trust to which the remedy of “piercing the veil” could apply.43 However, an 
overview of the South African matrimonial property law cases reveals that this 
point does not appear to have been obvious at all. Unfortunately, in the words of 
Binns-Ward J in Van Zyl v Kaye “[t]he expressions ‘alter ego trust’ and ‘sham 
trust’ are often used interchangeably and with confusing effect”.44 
3 DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT CASE LAW 
3 1 Jordaan v Jordaan 
In this case the parties married each other out of community of property with 
complete separation of assets in 1976. The defendant was a very successful busi-
nessman and had amassed an extensive estate. During the marriage a total of five 
trusts were set up.45 The plaintiff did not work outside the home and took care of 
the parties’ two children, one of whom was blind and mentally handicapped. The 
marriage broke down and the plaintiff instituted divorce proceedings, claiming 
inter alia a redistribution order in terms of section 7(3) and (4) of the Divorce 
Act.46 One of the issues in dispute was whether the assets of the five trusts could 
be taken into account in determining the value of the defendant’s estate and the 
extent of the redistribution order in the plaintiff’s favour.47 On behalf of the  
defendant, it was argued that the assets of the trusts should not be considered in 
the determination of his estate as his powers as a trustee were limited in terms of 
the provisions of the various trust deeds and the relevant trust legislation.48 
From the court’s exposition of the defendant’s personal assets it appears that 
two of the five trusts were effectively found to be sham trusts, although this term 
was not used by Traverso J in this regard.49 The first trust in issue was the Jomar 
Trust, which was founded by the defendant only after the divorce proceedings 
had commenced and which the defendant admitted was simply a fraudulent 
scheme to prejudice the plaintiff and frustrate any capital claim which she might 
have had in terms of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act.50 Traverso J opined that 
there was surely no need for her to comment on this conduct by the defendant 
and simply included the asset value of this trust as part of the defendant’s per-
sonal asset value.51 Similarly, the judge added to the defendant’s personal assets 
the capital value of another trust, the Joposama Trust, in respect of which the  
defendant admitted that in terms of the “letter of wishes” (which determined the 
manner in which the trust was to be administrated) he had access at all times to 
the full capital of this trust.52 The relevant part of the letter to the trustees read as 
________________________ 
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follows: “During my lifetime I should like you to be guided by my preferences 
with regard to the distribution of the income or capital of the trust.”53 By simply 
adding the asset value of these two trusts to the personal assets of the defendant, 
the court made it clear that it considered these two trusts never to have come into 
existence. 
With regard to the remaining three trusts (the Groothoek Trust, the JJ Jordaan 
Trust and the JJ Jordaan Investment Trust, which were all founded after the con-
clusion of the marriage), the court found that although the defendant’s powers as 
trustee were subject to the provisions of the various trust deeds and relevant leg-
islation, sight should not be lost of the fact that in the past the defendant had used 
these trusts for financial gain in his personal capacity and that he would un-
doubtedly do so again in the future.54 It is clear that the defendant’s personal 
business and the business of each of these trusts were closely intertwined.55 The 
court specifically questioned the administration of these three trusts.56 It ap-
peared from the financial statements and the uncontested evidence that huge 
amounts of money had flowed between the trusts and that loans had been made 
to the defendant by the trusts without any formal decisions by the trustees to this 
effect. All these transactions had taken place at the initiative and on the instruc-
tions of the defendant alone.57 The defendant regarded the income of all the 
trusts as his own58 and the Groothoek Trust, which carried out farming activities 
on the defendant’s farm (which he inherited) and generated a huge annual turn-
over, never paid any rent to the defendant.59 It also appeared that the defendant 
mero motu discharged the plaintiff as a trustee of the JJ Jordaan Trust which,  
inter alia, owned the defendant’s holiday home and other cash investments.60 
The defendant’s own evidence showed that the trusts were actually his alter ego 
and that they were regarded by him as such.61 
In her final decision, Traverso J explicitly stated that in the particular circum-
stances of the case it was not necessary to make a decision as to whether the 
“corporate veil” of the trusts had to be pierced,62 as the court, in terms of section 
7(5) of the Divorce Act, had a very wide discretion to take into consideration any 
relevant factor when making a just redistribution order in terms of section 7(3) 
and (4) of the Act.63 Therefore, by using its judicial discretion in terms of section 
7(3) to (5) of the Divorce Act,64 the court found that it was just and equitable to 
take the assets of these trusts into consideration when determining the extent of 
the redistribution order in favour of the plaintiff.  
In our opinion, it is nevertheless clear that if the court had not had such a re-
medial and reformative measure as that contained in section 7(3) to (6) of the  
Divorce Act at its disposal, it would not have hesitated to decide that the “corporate 
________________________ 
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veil” of the trusts had to be pierced owing to the abuse of the trust form of the 
Groothoek Trust, the JJ Jordaan Trust and the JJ Jordaan Investment Trust. Our 
viewpoint is supported by Alkema J’s decision in RP v DP,65 where he said in his 
discussion and criticism of the Jordaan case that “the court was entitled to, and 
did in fact, pierce the trust veil in this case”.66 Alkema J further criticised the 
Jordaan case for using its wide discretion in terms of section 7(3) of the Divorce 
Act instead of using the appropriate remedy of piercing the trust veil in the cir-
cumstances of the case.67 
It is further encouraging to see that in this early case on the position of trust 
assets upon divorce Traverso J in effect clearly distinguished between sham situ-
ations and abuse situations by treating the Jomar and the Joposama Trusts, which 
were only simulations, quite differently from the other three trusts (the Groothoek 
Trust, the JJ Jordaan Trust and the JJ Jordaan Investment Trust), where the prin-
ciples of trust administration were not adhered to. This case clearly illustrates 
that both sham situations and abuse situations may indeed be encountered in 
matrimonial matters. 
3 2 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal case, Badenhorst v Badenhorst, the parties were 
married with complete separation of property in December 1981. During the 
marriage, the Jubli Trust was created with the purpose of protecting the parties 
against their creditors and avoiding estate duty.68 The respondent and his brother 
were the trustees of the trust.69 Various properties and business shares were ac-
quired and registered in the name of the trust of which the appellant (the wife) 
was an income beneficiary.70 In October 2002 the parties separated and the  
respondent instituted divorce proceedings against the appellant. The appellant 
counterclaimed and, inter alia, sought a redistribution order in terms of section 
7(3) of the Divorce Act. She further requested that the assets of the Jubli Trust be 
regarded as assets in the respondent’s estate. She alleged that the trust was con-
trolled by the respondent and was in effect his alter ego and that had the trust not 
been created its assets would have vested in the respondent.71 The respondent 
neither denied nor admitted the allegation that the trust was his alter ego.72 The 
court a quo held that the Jubli Trust was a separate legal entity and that unless 
the court found the trust to be a sham, its assets were to be disregarded when de-
ciding what redistribution order to make in favour of the appellant.73 The appel-
lant appealed against this decision and sought an order from the Supreme Court 
of Appeal to the effect that, in addition to the amount awarded by the court a 
quo, half of the net asset value of the trust be paid to her by the respondent.74 
Although the court acknowledged the basic principle that the assets of a trust 
vest in its trustees and do not form part of the controlling spouse’s estate, 
________________________ 
 
65
 See also 3 6 below. 
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 Paras 34–35. 
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Combrinck AJA (as he was then) stated that this principle did not per se exclude 
such assets from being considered for purposes of making a redistribution  
order.75 Very importantly, the Supreme Court of Appeal thereupon set out what 
authors later referred to as the “but for” test76 by stating that “[i]n order to suc-
ceed in a claim that trust assets be included in the estate of one of the parties to a 
marriage there needs to be evidence that such party controlled the trust and but 
for the trust would have acquired and owned the assets in his own name”.77 The 
court also indicated that the control must be de facto and not necessarily de iure 
and gave the following explanation of how it should be determined whether a 
party has de facto control: “To determine whether a party has such control it is 
necessary to first have regard to the terms of the trust deed, and secondly to con-
sider how the affairs of the trust were conducted during the marriage.”78 As re-
gards the provisions of the trust deed in casu, the court noted that the trustees 
could determine the date of the vesting of rights in the beneficiaries; they had an 
unfettered discretion to do with the trust assets and income as they saw fit; the 
respondent could discharge his co-trustee and appoint someone else in his place; 
and he could be compensated for his duties as trustee, thereby ensuring an in-
come stream should he wish to make use of it.79 As regards the practical affairs 
of the trust, the court noted that the respondent seldom consulted his co-trustee; 
he was in full control of the trust; he paid scant regard to the difference between 
trust assets and his own assets; and but for the trust, ownership of all the assets 
would have vested in him.80 It was therefore clear that the respondent had de  
facto control of the trust. With reference to inter alia the Jordaan case,81 the 
court concluded that the value of the trust assets should have been added to the 
value of the respondent’s estate for purposes of determining what a just and equit-
able redistribution would be, regard being had to the factors referred to in terms 
of section 7(5) of the Divorce Act.82 
Although the court never referred to the common law remedy of veil piercing, 
it is submitted that the court actually applied it when adding the value of the trust 
assets to the value of the respondent’s estate for the purposes of the redistribution 
order. This is also the viewpoint of several other authors. For example, Stafford 
remarked that “it is evident in Badenhorst v Badenhorst that courts are willing to 
pierce the veneer of a trust should it appear that a trust is in fact the alter ego of a 
settlor”,83 while De Waal held the view that the court in Badenhorst unmistak-
ably went behind the trust form when it did exactly what the appellant requested 
it to do.84 Furthermore, support for this viewpoint is found in subsequent case 
law. For example, in RP v DP Alkema J categorically stated that Combrinck 
AJA “pierced the trust veil and came to the conclusion that, in making a redistri-
bution order, the value of the trust assets should be added to the value of the re-
spondent’s estate”,85 and further that  
________________________ 
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 Paras 8–9. 
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 See Du Toit (2015) 699–670. 
 
77
 Para 9. 
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79
 Para 10. 
 
80
 Para 11. 
 
81
 See 3 1 above. 
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“it is important to note that the learned judge of appeal in Badenhorst supra, having 
examined the terms of the trust deed and the manner of control of trust assets and 
affairs, lifted the corporate veil in considering whether or not the court was entitled 
to take the value of trust assets into account when making a redistribution order”.86  
There are, however, a few dissident opinions in this regard. 
Firstly, in his analysis of the Badenhorst case, Joffe concluded that the court 
found that the Jubli Trust “was a sham” as it included the assets of the trust as 
part of the husband’s estate.87 This reasoning was perhaps based on the wording 
of Combrinck AJA’s “but for” test where he indicated what had to be proved 
“[i]n order to succeed in a claim that trust assets be included in the estate of one 
of the parties”.88 It is, however, opined that the emphasised wording in the “but 
for” test was erroneous as Combrinck AJA later on in his conclusion clearly  
stated that it was not the “trust assets” that should be added to the respondent’s 
estate, but rather the “value of the trust assets” [own emphasis].89 Stafford further 
indicated that Joffe’s reference to the Jubli Trust as a sham was probably created 
by Combrinck AJA’s acceptance of the court a quo’s conclusion that a redistri-
bution order would not be made in respect of the trust’s assets, unless the trust 
was found to be a sham.90 In the light of the theoretical foundation of a sham 
trust,91 it is clear, however, that the trust in Badenhorst was not a sham and 
Joffe’s viewpoint cannot be supported. Both De Waal and Du Toit pointed out 
that the court in Badenhorst clearly accepted the fact that a valid trust was cre-
ated, but that the trust form was debased.92 
Secondly, in Van Zyl v Kaye Binns-Ward J opined that the Badenhorst deci-
sion was not a matter in which the court went behind the trust form93  
“as the appeal court considered that it would be just and equitable to have regard to 
the value of the trust’s assets for the purposes of determining the amount of the 
contribution by way of a monetary award, rather than a transfer of assets”.94  
In this regard, Du Toit pointed out that an interesting aspect of the Badenhorst 
case was that the respondent had enough money to make the full redistribution 
payment out of his personal estate and that there was therefore no need for the 
court to find that the trust assets in fact vested in him personally and could be 
used towards satisfaction of the appellant’s successful redistribution claim.95 
Binns-Ward J, however, conceded that his viewpoint may be wrong by saying 
the following:  
“However, if I am wrong in my analysis of the judgment in Badenhorst, and the 
court did indeed go behind the trust in that matter, it would seem that it did so on 
the premise of the respondent’s resort to the trust’s existence in that case as an 
unconscionable means to evade the obligations attendant on the dissolution of his 
marriage.”96  
________________________ 
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It is our respectful opinion that this concession by Binns-Ward J reflects the pre-
cise state of affairs in the Badenhorst case. 
3 3 BC v CC 
In BC v CC the parties married each other in 1991 out of community of property 
with application of the accrual system. In protracted divorce proceedings insti-
tuted in 2004, the plaintiff, inter alia, sought an accrual claim and an order that 
the value of assets held by the Ardingly Estate Trust, established by the first de-
fendant (the husband), be taken into consideration in determining the accrual of 
his estate.97 (From the given facts it is unclear whether the trust was established 
prior to or after the conclusion of the marriage.) Although the plaintiff was also 
appointed a trustee of the trust at some stage, she was unsure when this appoint-
ment was effected and was never involved in the management of the trust.98 In 
support of her claims the plaintiff made the following allegations in her sum-
mons: the defendant had full de facto control over the management, acquisition 
and sale of assets of the trust; he treated the trust as his alter ego; he had effec-
tive control over the management of the trust in terms of the trust deed as he 
could appoint and dismiss trustees at will; he made extensive use of the trust to 
purchase and sell valuable properties and substantially increased his personal 
loan account with the trust; he personally funded the acquisition of assets for  
the trust; and he withdrew funds from the trust assets to comply with his personal 
obligations. The first defendant pleaded in limine that the summons lacked 
averments necessary to sustain the claim for inclusion of the value of the assets 
held on behalf of the trust in determining the accrual of his estate.99 At the com-
mencement of the trial the second to fifth respondents (the co-trustees) also 
raised a point in limine and applied for certain paragraphs of the plaintiff’s par-
ticulars of claim to be struck down. They contended that the relief claimed was 
bad in law and contrary to the provisions of section 12 of the Trust Property 
Control Act; that the court was not vested with any discretion to include assets 
other than the personal assets of the spouse in determining the accrual of his  
estate; and that the plaintiff did not seek an order that the trust be set aside or a 
declarator that the property owned by the trust was in fact owned by her hus-
band.100 
Although Dambuza J acknowledged the core principle of the trust concept as 
set out in section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act, she indicated that the 
matter did not end there. She continued to explain that  
“where a trust is in fact a sham and where the trust assets are de facto the assets of 
a spouse in a marriage relationship, the value of the assets ostensibly held by the 
spouse on behalf of the trust may be taken into account in determining the accrual 
in the estate of the spouse concerned”.101  
The court further opined that the fact that the plaintiff did not seek a transfer  
of the trust assets to herself, but only that the value thereof be considered in the  
determination of the accrual in the first defendant’s estate, does not call for the 
exercise of a discretion. The judge stated that the issue simply entailed “determining 
________________________ 
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from the evidence what assets fall to be considered in determining accrual” and 
that such determination was, in her view, the same (in accrual claims) under  
the Matrimonial Property Act and (claims for redistribution orders) under the 
Divorce Act.102 As it seemed to the judge that generally a benefit enjoyed by a 
person from an asset adds value to the estate of that person, she was not persuaded 
that value derived or enjoyed by a spouse from assets of a trust should be ignored 
or that a court is precluded under section 4 of the Matrimonial Property Act from 
considering such value.103 She stated that this could never have been the inten-
tion of the legislature as  
“[s]uch an interpretation of the section would lead to abuse of protection of assets 
held on behalf of trusts and would open a leeway for spouses, on realising that the 
marriages might terminate, to acquire assets on behalf of the trust in the knowledge 
that courts may not inquire into the value enjoyed by them from such assets”.104  
Dambuza J was also not persuaded that the court was precluded from consider-
ing the value of such assets because there was no express prayer by the plaintiff 
that the trust assets “be deemed” to be those of the first defendant. In justification 
of these conclusions, the judge referred to the Badenhorst and Jordaan cases105 
and also to the unreported case of Smith v Smith,106 where Van der Byl AJ held 
that there was no basis for a different approach when considering accrual under 
the Matrimonial Property Act and redistribution under the Divorce Act if the  
evidence showed that the trust was the alter ego of one of the spouses in the  
divorce action. According to Dambuza J in the present case, courts have a duty 
under both section 7(3) to (5) of the Divorce Act and section 4 of the Matrimonial 
Property Act to properly consider any such alter ego allegations and to deter-
mine whether a spouse is the “beneficial owner” of the trust assets.107 In conclu-
sion the court stated that it was satisfied that the plaintiff’s allegations sufficient-
ly made out a case that the defendant held the assets in question for his own (de 
facto) benefit and thus for the relief sought.108 It consequently dismissed the co-
trustees’ contentions in limine to strike out certain paragraphs of the plaintiff’s 
particulars of claim.109 
It is our opinion that the result of this decision of the Eastern Cape, Port Eliza-
beth, Division of the High Court is indeed correct. However, the theoretical 
foundation for dismissing the co-trustees’ contentions in limine was all wrong. 
We are in agreement with Du Toit’s statement that while the affirmation for the 
consideration of trust assets in accrual claims must be welcomed, it is unclear on 
what basis the court reached this conclusion.110 A brief reflection on this decision 
highlights the confusion of the court between the actual relief sought and the 
remedy implied by the court. The decision is a clear example of a case where the 
court conflated the remedies of going behind the trust form and declaring the 
trust a sham. Du Toit also opined that the court in BC v CC fell prey to the dan-
ger of an unwholesome conflation of the law pertaining to sham trusts on the one 
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hand, and alter ego trusts on the other hand.111 While the court referred to a sham 
trust in this matter, it in effect applied the remedy of going behind the trust form 
by regarding the value of assets ostensibly owned by the trust as being the prop-
erty of the first defendant.112 The court’s reliance on the judgments in Jordaan 
and Badenhorst, neither of which is evocative of sham trusts, both being cases 
where the courts applied the remedy of going behind the trust form,113 is another 
indication that the court was wrong in referring to a sham trust in this case and 
not to an unconscionable abuse of the trust form. It is therefore a pity in our 
opinion that the court did not refer to and invoke the common law remedy of  
going behind the trust form,114 which was in reality the relief sought by the plain-
tiff. The court complicated matters even further by rationalising that the value 
enjoyed by a spouse from assets of a trust could be taken into account in terms  
of section 4 of the Matrimonial Property Act.115 It is no wonder that Ploos van 
Amstel J in MM v JM remarked that he had several difficulties with the decision 
in BC v CC and that Du Toit described the judgment as “perplexing”.116 
Nevertheless, Dambuza J should be commended for her insight that there 
should in principle be no difference between marriages with complete separation 
of property and marriages with the accrual system117 and that spouses married 
with the accrual system also need a remedy in the case of an abuse of the trust 
form,118 albeit not the remedy of declaring the trust a sham. 
(to be continued) 
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